Abstract
Introduction
When multiple processors or other devices access a shared memory, the correct behavior is often unclear. The most intuitive model is that each memory operation happens instantaneously in real-time, so that each load returns the value of the most recent store to the same memory location. Such a model, however, produces contention, arbitration, and serialization of memory accesses, which is unneeded in many applications and limits performance. At the other extreme, a system in which all processors could freely read and write inconsistent or stale values would be nearly impossible to program. A memory model is a specification of the desired behavior of the memory system from the programmer's point of view.
Sequential consistency is a multiprocessor memory model introduced by Lamport [16] . A memory system is sequentially consistent iff there always exists an interleaving of the program orders of all the processors such that each load returns the value of the most recent store to the same address. Intuitively, this means that processors can get out-of-sync with each other, perhaps because of caching and buffers, but that the same results could have been achieved had the executions of the processors been interleaved in some other way. Sequential consistency is important both as a practical memory model that provides ease-of-programming while allowing efficient hardware optimizations (e.g. [12] ) and also as an extensively studied memory model that can be used to understand other, more relaxed models (e.g. [1] ).
Model checking [7] has emerged as the dominant paradigm for formally verifying temporal properties of computer system designs. One of the most successful application domains for model checking has been multiprocessor cache coherence protocols (e.g., [17, 10, 6, 8, 15, 23, 26, 3, 20, 14] are some early works). The application domain is commercially very important, since almost all high-end servers are now cache-coherent multiprocessors; the protocols are tricky, highly concurrent, and hence bug-prone; and the protocols can be modeled in finite state, naturally supporting model checking.
An important verification task is to check whether a memory system implements a specified memory model. Unfortunately, the general problem of determining whether a finite-state protocol implements sequential consistency is undecidable [2] , so directly attacking this problem via model checking is impossible. More subtle approaches are needed.
In this paper, we present experimental results on a methodology for proving sequential consistency using model checking. In contrast, previous experimental results on the use of model checking for reasoning about the correctness of cache coherence protocols either prove much weaker properties, or work only on a very restricted class of protocols which don't incorporate the subtle optimizations that are prone to introduce errors in real protocols. Recent theoretical results [9, 21] show that model-checking can in principle be applied to proving sequential consistency of sophisticated, real-world protocols, but provide no experimental results.
In our methodology, the protocol being verified is augmented with additional (finite-state) bookkeeping information. We call the augmented protocol the observer. A finite-state checker examines runs of the observer and certifies that a run is indeed sequentially consistent. Model checking the entire finite-state system determines whether the checker will certify all possible runs, proving sequential consistency of the protocol. In Section 2, we describe a method for creating observers, along with the corresponding checker. We then present experimental results in using our methodology to prove sequential consistency of a substantial directory-based cache coherence protocol. The presentation here is necessarily brief; details can be found in our technical report [4] .
Related Work
There has been considerable work over the years on verifying memory system protocols and memory models. For brevity, we mention here only closely related work.
The use of an observer, or witness, to aid in reasoning about the correctness of a protocol, is an old idea. Our use of an observer was inspired by the work of Plakal et al. [19] , who introduce a verification approach based on logical clocks and apply it to a directory-based protocol. In contrast to logical clocks, which are unbounded, our observer is finite state, making it possible to use it as part of a model-checking approach.
Henzinger et al. [11] propose a very similar approach to ours, using a finite-state observer to reorder loads and stores to construct a witness of sequential consistency. Because of the finite-state limit on reordering, the method is too restrictive to handle the types of optimizations typically found in real protocols, such as the optimization due to Scheurich that we describe in Section 3. We note that Henzinger et al. prove very strong results for protocols in their restrictive class, namely that it is sufficient to reduce verification of a protocol with arbitrarily large parameters (number of processors, number of blocks, number of values per block) to a fixed-parameter problem. In contrast, our method applies to verification of only fixed-parameter protocols.
Nalumasu et al. [18] propose the Test Model-Checking technique, in which a protocol is checked against various predefined finite-state automata that test certain memory model properties. These tests can be considered to be finitestate observers. By combining these tests, it is possible to verify memory models that are close to, but not identical to, sequential consistency.
Two recent works describe a model-checking approach for automatically proving sequential consistency of realworld protocols [21, 9] . However, no experimental results are presented. This paper describes experimental results for a variation of one of these approaches [9] . In the current paper, the observer is constructed manually, unlike the automatic construction of [9] , but is designed to have significantly fewer states in order to mitigate the state space explosion problem of model checking. Our results show that approaches of this type are indeed feasible for realistic protocols.
The Verification Method
In what follows, a protocol is a finite-state machine parameterized by the number of processors p, memory blocks b, and possible values per memory block v. Among the possible actions (transitions) of the protocol are load (LD) and store (ST) actions, which indicate the processor, the address (memory block number), and the value loaded or stored. A protocol run is a sequence of protocol actions that lead from state to state, starting with the initial state of the protocol. A protocol trace is the subsequence of a protocol run that includes exactly the ST and LD operations of the run. A serial trace is one in which each load returns the value of the most recent (prior to the load) store to the same block (or some initial value, if there were no prior stores to that block). A protocol is sequentially consistent if every one of its traces has a reordering that respects the per-processor ordering of the trace, and is serial.
Our methodology for constructing observers is based on a bookkeeping structure we call a window. To understand what a window is, we first note that there are two notions of time associated with a protocol: real time, and reordered (or logical) time, in which operations and actions of the protocol are serialized so that every LD gets the value of the most recent ST. Intuitively, a window summarizes the overall status of the memory system in reordered time. The window includes the active STs (i.e. those which may be read by future LDs of the protocol), their ordering in logical time, and where the most recent loads have occurred in logical time. A window observer annotates the original protocol run with windows. A finite-state checker (described in Section 2.1) can prove that a run is sequentially consistent by using the windows. Let us now consider these ideas in more detail. Intuitively, for real-world protocols, a window observer may be obtained for a protocol by augmenting the protocol to output a window after each protocol action, thereby annotating the protocol runs with windows, and simplifying the run alphabet of the observer so that actions other than windows, LD and ST operations are replaced by the NULL action. The NULL action abstracts away the detailed behavior of the protocol, allowing the use of a universal checker for all observers.
Definition 1 A window is a sequence of nodes. Nodes can be one of four different types: delete vectors (DV), logical pointers (LP), stores (ST), and last load indicators (LL

Checkers
The checker is a finite-state machine parameterized by p, b, and v, just as protocols are. The same (family of) checker is used for all protocols. The checker examines the annotated protocol run generated by the window observer. It always saves a copy of the most recently seen window, and it checks each subsequent action/window against the most recently seen window: (c) There were no intervening memory operations, and one logical pointer has moved forward. Intuitively, a processor is updating its state to a newer one. The details of this change are tedious, but basically, the DV preceding the LP that is moving is bitwise ORed into the closest subsequent DV, the LP is free to move to any subsequent point immediately following a DV, and a new DV false node is added immediately after the LP's new location.
Checker Rules
(d) There were no intervening memory operations, and some ST nodes have been deleted. Again, the details of this change are tedious. Basically, a sequence of ST nodes without any LP nodes separating them can be deleted. Their corresponding DV nodes are bitwise ORed, and any deleted ST nodes are also marked on the remaining DV node.
If every action and annotation the checker sees is legal, the checker accepts the run.
Combining an observer with the checker allows us to prove sequential consistency via model checking. If the run of an observer is accepted by the checker, then that run is sequentially consistent. Since both the observer and checker are finite-state, we can verify by model checking that all runs of the observer are sequentially consistent, which implies that the original protocol is sequentially consistent.
Example Protocol
The true test of our methodology requires experimentation. We have developed paper-and-pencil window observers for three different cache coherence protocols and selected the most challenging, a directory-based protocol, for the full model-checking experiment.
The protocol is a variant of one provided by the Multifacet group from the University of Wisconsin, to which we have added an optimization due to Scheurich [22] , that allows a processor to continue to read a cache block after acknowledging an invalidation of that block. With this optimization, the protocol should be sequentially consistent, but not coherent (i.e., processors can continue to use stale data). The protocol involves several interacting entitiesthe processors, a directory, and a network interface -and is comparable in complexity to commercial directory-based protocols.
Roughly, processors may have three types of access to a block, with three corresponding "stable" processor states per block: M(modify), S(shared), or I(invalid). A processor may do a ST only when in the M state and may do a LD only in the S or M states. For each block, at most one processor is in the M state at any given time. The directory coordinates access to blocks of memory, and is the default owner of a block when no processor has Modify access to that block.
When a processor needs to upgrade from one stable state to another in order to do a LD or ST operation, the processor initiates a transaction and enters a transient state. Several race conditions may arise, resulting in numerous transient protocol states to track the possibilities. Here, we present some illustrative situations. Further examples and the full protocol description can be found in our technical report [4] .
1. If several processors share a block, and processor P wants Modify access, then P sends a GETX (Get Exclusive) message to the directory. The directory returns the value of block along with the number of current sharers. The directory also sends a message to each sharer asking them to invalidate their copy of the block and to send an ACK to P once they have done so. P waits in the transient state IM (Invalid to Modify) until it gets both the data and all the ACKs before doing a LD or ST to the block.
2. If one processor Q is owner of a block, and processor P wants Modify access, then P sends a GETX message to the directory; the directory forwards this request to Q and sets P as the new owner of the block. Processor Q (which is in state M) receives a "forwarded GETX" message from the directory, sends the data to P and goes to the I state. Processor P waits in the IM state until it gets the data from Q.
3. Scheurich's optimization allows a block to continue to be read after ownership has been released. We add a new cache block state I*, which indicates that the block has been invalidated, but we are in optimization mode. The I* state is entered when a processor receives an invalidate for a block that was in the shared state S, or a forwarded GETX for a block that was in the exclusive state M. While in optimization mode, the processor can continue to read the block, even though the invalidation has been acknowledged. As soon as the cache receives a request from any other entity, however, optimization mode ends, and the cache block state changes from I* to I.
The window observer for the directory protocol behaves just like the protocol itself, with the main difference being that the observer updates and outputs a window, while executing the protocol. Briefly, a window can be changed in three ways: addition of a ST node, moving a logical pointer node, or deletion of a ST node:
Initially, the observer outputs a window containing just the p LP nodes, in any order.
Each time a processor or the directory sends data to another processor, if the sender's LP is later than the recipient's LP, then the recipient's LP gets moved immediately after the sender's LP. Intuitively, when the recipient receives the data, it must have moved forward in time at least to pass the sender. We found it convenient to introduce a LP node for the directory. This is purely an implementation detail that makes it easy to determine where to advance the processors' LP nodes in certain cases.
Upon a ST operation, a new ST node is created in the window and is placed just before LP P . Upon a LD operation, the observer makes no changes to the window.
To keep the window size finite, the observer deletes those ST nodes which will never be read in the future: for each pair of successive LP nodes, for each block B, the observer deletes all but the latest ST B node between the two LP nodes. Also, for each block B, all but the last ST B node to the earliest LP node is deleted.
We chose the Murphi verification system [10] for our experiments, mainly for ease-of-use and out of familiarity, and also because Murphi has proven successful for many cache protocol verification efforts. Modeling cache protocols in Murphi is routine [14] , and many examples are available as part of the standard Murphi distribution. The main downside is that Murphi does not use symbolic model checking [5] , precluding one of the most powerful techniques for combatting state explosion.
We started with verifying basic correctness properties of the protocol itself. Proving sequential consistency should wait until after the protocol is debugged. Not surprisingly, we discovered several minor bugs and one subtle bug (with an error trace requiring 10 network messages) in the initial protocol. This first phase of the project corresponds to a typical cache protocol formal verification effort.
After fixing these bugs, we proceeded to add the observer and checker to the model. Adding the observer/checker consisted of adding a variable to store the most recently seen window, and then weaving additional actions to manipulate this variable into the rules that implement the protocol. Whenever the window is updated or a load or store is performed, the checker is invoked to make sure the action was legal. No DV nodes were needed for this protocol, so we omitted them. (DV nodes track deleted ST nodes to prevent an LP node from jumping between a ST and the subsequent LP, where a LD may have executed. In this protocol, LP nodes always jump to a position immediately following another LP node, so the problem does not arise.) Model checking uncovered several bugs in the combined protocol/observer/checker, including one serious protocol bug, involving staying in optimization mode in a situation when it should have been canceled. This bug had eluded our earlier model-checking without the observer/checker. Eventually, we were able to debug the observer/checker as well, proving the protocol sequentially consistent.
The total effort was three students, as a class project, working part-time, for approximately two months. In other words, the total effort was comparable to that required to model check only simple correctness properties, but the result is much stronger. Adding the observer and checker was neither easy, nor extremely difficult. The complexity was much like handling a somewhat more sophisticated protocol.
The other practical concern is state explosion. Table 1 shows run times and reachable state counts for the protocol with and without the observer/checker. As can be seen, the observer/checker adds a substantial amount of state, but the blow-up isn't outrageous. Again, the results with observer/checker are comparable to what one would expect if verifying a somewhat more complex protocol without observer/checker. Additional work is needed on reducing state explosion, but the results show that our method is clearly on the edge of feasibility for realistic protocols.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented experimental results on a methodology for proving sequential consistency of memory protocols by using model checking. Our experiments indicate that the method is indeed feasible in practice, although additional research to reduce state explosion is needed.
The main directions to reduce state explosion are to try symbolic model checking and related techniques, and to search for domain-specific reductions. For example, the state of the window is likely to be highly determined by the state of the protocol, suggesting that techniques like functionally dependent variables [13] may be very helpful. Another possibility is to partition the checker into several smaller sub-checkers, each of which using only part of the window, that can be model-checked separately, thereby substantially reducing the state space. 
